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Abstract
Transboundary haze pollution is an almost annual occurrence in Southeast Asia. Haze originates 
from peat and forest fires mostly in Indonesia, with Malaysia and Singapore suffering the worst 
of its effects. Most of these fires are manmade, and linked to land clearing activities of local 
and foreign commercial oil palm plantations. The regional nature of haze has concentrated 
mitigation activities at the ASEAN level. However these initiatives continually fail to effectively 
mitigate haze. This article argues that haze mitigation has been problematic due to the ASEAN 
style of regional engagement, which prioritizes the maintenance of national sovereignty. States 
are compelled to act in their national interests, as opposed to the collective regional interests. 
The economic importance of the oil palm sector to the states involved, coupled with traditionally 
close relationships between key economic actors and political elites, meant that the maintenance 
of the status quo, where major plantation companies could continue to clear land using the 
cost-effective method of burning, was of crucial national interest. Therefore, the ASEAN style 
of regional engagement has enabled member states to shape ASEAN initiatives to preserve the 
interests of these political and economic elite, while the public continue to suffer the haze. 
Keywords: Transboundary, haze pollution, environmental issues, ASEAN-way mitigation efforts.
Introduction
Transboundary haze is the Southeast Asian region’s first and most publicly-identifiable regional 
environmental crisis (Elliott, 2003). This haze has been an annual recurring problem since the 
1980s. Haze is smoke that originates from peat and forest fires, mostly in Indonesia, and becomes 
transboundary when it travels across national boundaries. The haze affects the health of some 75 
million people and the economies of up to six Southeast Asian nations, with Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore being the most severely affected (Mayer, 2006). Research has shown that most of 
these fires are manmade, and can be traced back to illegal land clearing activities of commercial 
local and foreign (mostly Malaysian and Singaporean) oil palm plantations (Caroko, Komarudin, 
Obidzinski, & Gunarso, 2011; Casson, 2002; Colfer, 2002; Fairhurst & McLaughlin, 2009; K. T. 
Tan, Lee, Mohamed, & Bhatia, 2009). Using fire is the most cost-effective way to clear land in 
preparation for commercial planting (Interviewee I49, 2011).1
Southeast Asian states have largely elected to address the issue of transboundary haze 
through collaboration at the regional level through the Association of Southeast Asian 
nations (ASEAN), with limited success. This paper argues that the regionalism of haze 
mitigation through ASEAN initiatives have failed to curb haze because the ASEAN model 
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of regionalism which emphasizes national sovereignty and self-determination (Interviewee 
A7, 2010; Narine, 1998a; Smith, 2004; Zainal Abidin [M38], 2010), has allowed member 
states to shape collective mitigation initiatives at the ASEAN level in accordance with the 
interests of political and economic elites. Nesadurai  has argued that ‘the ASEAN Way 
is often only strictly adhered to and enforced by states in areas where crucial economic 
interests are affected’ (Nesadurai, 2008). Maintaining current practises in the region’s oil 
palm plantation sector is indeed an area of crucial economic interest for Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore, firstly due to its substantial contribution to GDP, and secondly due to the 
traditionally close relationships between key economic actors and political elites (Nesadurai, 
2003). This paper therefore argues that the states involved have chosen to adhere to the 
ASEAN Way when dealing with the haze to preserve crucial economic interests in the oil 
palm plantation sector. At the ASEAN level, this has resulted in initiatives that protect elite 
corporate interests, preserve state sovereignty, and deflect responsibility on the haze issue 
(Tan [S7], 2010; Yahaya [M13], 2010). 
This article is divided into two sections. The first section introduces the concept of 
political regionalism. It notes that, while regionalism has been viewed in the literature as 
an important strategy for resolving common environmental problems, the ASEAN model 
of regionalism, with its selective use of the ASEAN Way principles by member states, 
has not been conducive to this. The second section reviews the ASEAN haze initiatives. 
Using data obtained from fieldwork consisting of archival research and semi-structured 
interviews conducted in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore among government officials, 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) representatives, journalists, and academicians, 
this paper argues that states chose to adhere to the ASEAN Way principles while shaping 
these initiatives. As a result, these initiatives have largely been ineffective in curbing haze, 
but effective in protecting the interests of the business elites. As a whole, this article argues 
that ASEAN is not the appropriate forum to effectively carry out haze mitigation, because 
the ASEAN style of regionalism allows for states to act in the interests of their political and 
economic elites, as compared to the collective interests.
The Regionalism of Environmental Issues
Indonesia is currently the world’s biggest producer of palm oil (Bernama, 2010; Jarvis, 
et al., 2010; Mccarthy, 2010; Reuters, 2011; World Growth, 2011), contributing to about 
51% of world production (Di, 2011). In terms of revenue, palm oil contributes around 
5% of Indonesia’s GDP annually (iStockAnalyst, 2009). Alongside powerful Indonesian 
companies like Bakrie Sumatra Plantations, Duta Palma, Astra Agro, Makin Group, 
and Musim Mas (Van Gelder, 2004), many well-connected Malaysian and Singaporean 
companies have also established operations in Indonesia. For example, Sime Darby and 
Tabung Haji Plantations are prominent Malaysian GLCs, while Genting Plantations, Kuala 
Lumpur Kepong and IOI Plantations are owned by powerful and well-connected Chinese-
Malaysian tycoons (Gomez, 2009). Currently, Malaysian and Singaporean companies 
hold more than two-thirds of Indonesia’s total plantation area (WALHI, Sawit Watch, & 
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CELCOR, 2009). Malaysian investments have an investment value of US$ 702.4 million 
and Singaporean investments in the sector amount to US$ 11.2 million (Sawit Watch, 2008). 
In this way, oil palm has become an increasingly important economic sector for Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore (Pichler, 2011). Due to the traditionally close relationship many of 
these companies enjoy with their respective countries’ political elite, these companies have 
largely been able to act with impunity in their operations to maximise profit, but with the 
side effect of transboundary haze. 
However, as awareness of the source and dangers of smoke haze spread, Southeast Asian 
governments increasingly came under pressure from the public and civil society at the 
national, regional, and international level to address the haze issue(Ho, 1997; Interviewee 
I25, 2010; Interviewee S4 & Interviewee S5, 2010; Interviewee S18, 2010; Lim [S13], 
2010; New Straits Times, 1997). There is an assumption in the literature that as the demand 
for regional cooperation increases (in this case, the demand for haze mitigation by civil 
society) because of deepening economic regionalization, it will be  matched by a ‘supply’ 
of appropriate regional institutions (Jayasuria, 2004). Hence, in 1997, the Myanmar Foreign 
Minister who chaired Environmental Affairs at ASEAN at the time suggested that the 
haze should be addressed at the ASEAN level separately from other environmental issues 
(Interviewee A2, 2010) due to its transboundary nature, its extreme impact to society, and 
its close relation to natural resource management (Interviewee A7, 2010; Mat Akhir [A1], 
2010). ASEAN member countries unanimously supported this as an opportunity to address 
civil society’s concerns. This marked the start of the ‘regionalism’ of haze mitigation at the 
ASEAN level (Interviewee A2, 2010). 
‘Political regionalism’ refers to top-down, state-led projects of cooperation that emerge as 
a result of intergovernmental dialogues and treaties (Breslin & Higgott, 2003). This type of 
political regionalism focuses on regional inter-state cooperation, involving the negotiation 
and construction of inter-state agreements or regimes. Regionalism may involve the creation 
of formal institutions, but it can often be based on a much looser structure, involving patterns 
of regular meetings with some rules attached, together with mechanisms for preparation 
and follow up. Such cooperative arrangements can serve a wide variety of purposes: to 
secure welfare gains; to promote common values; or to solve common problems, especially 
problems arising from increased levels of regional interdependence (Hurrell, 1995). Political 
regionalism therefore ‘involves a set of social functions that is concerned with making 
collective choices among people delineated by geographical proximity and other shared 
notions of sameness’ (Boas, 2000). 
The regionalism of environmental issues has been viewed in the literature as an important 
strategy for resolving common environmental problems. Regionalism scholars argue 
that action at the regional level should be able to help aggregate individual national 
policy positions around a joint position, and thus facilitate both the establishment and the 
implementation of multilateral agreements(Koh & Robinson, 2002). For example, scholars 
such as Koh and Robinson (2002) and Hurrell (1995) have argued that regional systems 
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of environmental management can be an important complement to national governance in 
solving common regional environmental problems. As Campbell (2005) argues:
“Environmental regionalism is often viewed as a more feasible, effective, 
and democratic approach for addressing environmental problems that 
transcend national boundaries ... Primarily because a small number of 
countries are involved, regionalism is seen as more likely to facilitate 
participation and represent the interests of all the parties ... Regional 
commonalities such as geography, culture, values, and economic and 
political systems, combined with a smaller number of countries needed 
for consensus, will make agreement easier to reach”. 
However, this paper argues that the model of regionalism is an important determinant 
on whether the regionalism process is effective in solving regional problems or not. For 
example, the European Union’s (EU) model of regionalism is characterized by supranational 
institutions and the pooling of sovereignty. In ASEAN, the maintenance of national 
sovereignty remains the focus of regionalism. Therefore, the ASEAN model of regionalism 
differs from the EU, owing to different emphases on sovereignty (Kim, 2011; Murray, 
2010). This difference means that some forms of transnational coordination and cooperation 
are simply more feasible in Europe than they are in Southeast Asia (Beeson, 2007). The 
following paragraphs discuss the ASEAN style of regionalism, noting that this model has 
generally not been conducive in collectively addressing Southeast Asian environmental 
issues.
ASEAN was founded to help accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural 
development in the region (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). These goals are expressed in 
various ASEAN treaties including its founding document, the 1967 Bangkok Declaration 
(Katanyuu, 2006). These documents also prescribe approaches to regional engagement, 
known collectively as the ASEAN Way, a set of behavioural and procedural norms. These 
include the search for consensus; the sanctity of sovereign rights and non-interference; the 
principles of sensitivity and politeness; non-confrontational approaches to negotiations; 
behind-the-scenes discussions; an emphasis on informal and non-legalistic procedures; and 
flexibility (Kivimaki, 2001). 
A common explanation for the persistence of the haze is the limitations posed by the 
ASEAN Way of regional governance.  Scholars like Tan (2005), Tay (2002), Yahaya 
(2000), Nguitragool (2011), and Chang and Rajan (2001) have argued that while regional 
environmental governance can be instrumental in finding solutions to collective action 
problems, this model of ASEAN cooperation does not work when dealing with environmental 
challenges such as fires and haze. Scholars have argued that because the ASEAN Way is 
too deeply engrained in the process of regional governance in ASEAN, member states 
cannot imagine ASEAN functioning any other way (Kamaruddin [M26], 2010; Lew [M6] 
& Interviewee M7, 2010; Nagulendran [M34] & Interviewee M35, 2010; Syarif [I2], 2010); 
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Severino (2006) has described the ASEAN Way as a ‘doctrine’; something ideological and 
therefore, to be adhered to at all costs. Therefore, Aggarwal and Chow (2010) insist that 
ASEAN states ‘undoubtedly desire the elimination of the haze problem’, but were unable to 
balance this desire with their stronger desire to comply with broader ASEAN Way norms of 
non-interference and decision making by consensus. 
These scholars argue that the persistence of the haze can be explained by the fact that the 
ASEAN organization is too tightly bound to these norms as guidance devices for decision-
making (Kratochwil, 1984, 1989; Narine, 1998b).They argue that due to the necessarily 
strict adherence to the ASEAN Way, environmental problems in ASEAN like the haze 
are approached through the non-interference principle. This impedes collective problem-
solving methods when dealing with natural resource issues, as other states are not allowed 
to pressure members into acting in accordance with collective interest. Because of this, it 
is argued that ASEAN states struggle to draw a line between respecting their neighbouring 
government’s right to self-determination and cooperatively mediating the haze situation 
which ultimately affects the entire region (Tan, 2005). Therefore, ASEAN has emphasized 
policy pronouncements and rhetoric over actual implementation of effective haze mitigation 
efforts (Chang & Rajan, 2001), largely rendering them ineffective. 
This article finds these arguments flawed. States do not blindly follow the ASEAN Way 
principles due to some deeply ingrained ‘habit’. On the contrary, this article argues that states 
choose to adhere to the ASEAN Way if it is in their interests to do so. This is the crux of the 
ASEAN model of regionalism. While the European model of regionalism is characterised 
by the pooling of sovereignty, the ASEAN model is characterised by its maintenance of 
national sovereignty (Kim, 2011; Murray, 2010). This difference in emphases of sovereignty 
explains why environmental regionalism in Europe has been successful while environmental 
regionalism in Southeast Asia has not. While the main drivers of the EU are its supranational 
institutions, the main drivers of the ASEAN organization are member states (Interviewee 
A7, 2010; Narine, 1998a; Smith, 2004; Zainal Abidin [M38], 2010). Unlike the European 
Commission, the ASEAN Secretariat has been deliberately denied the resources and mandate 
necessary to carry out such a responsibility (Kim, 2011), and continues to be subordinate 
to national secretariats (Beeson, 2007; Solingen, 2005). This ASEAN model of regionalism 
therefore enables member states to control the scope, depth and speed of regionalism in 
ASEAN, which best suits their national interests (Kim, 2011). Therefore, while decision-
making in the EU is geared towards the collective interest, decision-making in ASEAN is 
shaped according to the interests of its member states (Interviewee A7, 2010). Hence, states 
are free to decide whether or not to adhere to ASEAN Way norms, depending on whether 
it is in their best interests. Instead of being a limiting effect on state behavior, the ASEAN 
Way can be better explained as tools for political action that states can selectively use in line 
with their interests (Khoo, 2004). 
Subscribing to the ASEAN Way when necessary shields national governments from 
having to commit to addressing joint tasks that governments either find too demanding 
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administratively, politically difficult (if these went against dominant national interests), or 
not sufficiently important given a set of national priorities. In keeping with non-interference 
norms, the parties can stress the primacy of national laws, policy-making and implementation 
(Elliott, 2003). In keeping with the procedural voluntarism of the ASEAN Way, parties 
can avoid legally binding agreements. This clause, along with sovereignty concerns has 
also resulted in a lack of central institutions in ASEAN to uphold compliance or any 
credible mechanisms for settling disputes in an objective and binding manner (Severino, 
Hew, Suryadinata, Hsu, & Moeller, 2005). This complicates the application of multilateral 
pressure and collective problem-solving methods (Tan, 2005). The non-interference clause 
also enables governments to exclude any issue deemed to be politically sensitive from 
ever being discussed at the regional level (Nesadurai, 2008). As a result, these principles 
provide members with considerable autonomy to determine the extent to which they would 
implement regional environmental agendas, even those that they have agreed to initially 
(Nesadurai, 2008). Indeed, as an institution centered around the promotion of economic 
cooperation and prosperity among its members (Smith, 2004), environmental objectives are 
therefore often overlooked in the pursuance of these economic goals. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the relationship between key economic actors and 
national political elites in Southeast Asia are traditionally very close (Nesadurai, 2003). 
These relationships prevalent within the region’s forestry and agricultural industry 
(Aggarwal & Chow, 2010) has meant that many political parties in power have direct links 
to natural resources (Resosudarmo [I26], 2010). This situation encouraged elites to favour 
arrangements that ensure domestic and regional political economic stability and market 
access to these natural resources (Solingen, 1999), while providing a lack of incentives 
for effective regional environmental conservation. This paper therefore argues that the 
protection of these elite interests was more important than responding to environmental 
issues through ASEAN (Cotton, 1999). 
As a result, ASEAN developed into an elite-centered framework of regionalism (Ferguson, 
2004), where (elite) economic growth takes precedence over environmental protection 
(Nesadurai, 2008). States were unwilling to antagonize domestic interests by applying 
prohibitive national or regional-level environmental law, particularly when such natural 
resource interests are tightly bound to a leader’s political power base (Aggarwal & Chow, 
2010; Boas, 2000). Member states sought to protect the interests of the political and 
economic elites by maintaining their ‘power of veto’ (by denying such a mandate to its 
Secretariat) over effective policy innovation at the ASEAN level (Cotton, 1999). Therefore, 
member states were free to pick and choose instances where they would strictly follow the 
ASEAN Way, or ignore it, as long as it was in the interests of the member states’ political 
and economic elites. 
Hence, with national priorities skewed to elite interests connected with national resources, 
ASEAN initiatives have thus far had a strong preference in the observation of the ASEAN 
Way where protection of the regional environment is concerned (Abdullah, 2002). The 
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application of the ASEAN Way has enabled members to retain a great degree of domestic 
policy autonomy (Nesadurai, 2008) over environmental matters. Hence, ASEAN operates 
not from any set of strict legal procedure like the EU but instead, by creating sequential 
issue-by-issue ad-hoc coalitions (Pempel, 2005). Declarations and agreements adopted at 
the ASEAN level usually articulate mere ‘principles’ for regional environmental cooperation 
but rarely include guidelines for national environmental practice which could be construed 
as ‘intervention’ (Elliott, 2003). Therefore, ASEAN environmental initiatives have relied 
on voluntary cooperation,  non-binding agreements, and a weak institutional infrastructure 
(Campbell, 2005) emphasizing aspirational policy pronouncements and rhetoric over actual 
implementation (Chang & Rajan, 2001). 
This rhetoric has had no observable impacts on the intergovernmental policy practices 
of the ASEAN members and have failed to transform their trade and investment patterns 
(Kim, 2011). Greater priority has thus been attached to economic growth than to health and 
environmental protection in ASEAN (Campbell, 2005). While member states acknowledge 
that they had environmental problems in common, their material interests in addressing them 
arose from the importance of domestic economic progress and development. Therefore, it was 
more important for these states to maintain the availability of, and access to natural resources 
(Elliott, 2003) like timber and forest products to be used in the pursuit of development. In 
this way, adherence to the ASEAN Way provides an avenue for member states to pursue 
their national interests with minimal resistance, while ensuring that the regional atmosphere 
is healthy and supportive. As a result, effective cooperative regional arrangements over 
environmental issues at the ASEAN level have been problematic (Elliott, 2000, 2001, 2003; 
Karim, 2008). These problems of course extend to haze mitigation activities at the ASEAN 
level, which the following section discusses. 
This paper argues that ASEAN states were pressured by civil society to act upon the haze, 
but at the same time also faced economic pressures from the region’s oil palm plantation 
sector. Therefore, states had to address both concerns from civil society and the economic 
elite by engaging at the ASEAN level over haze, but in a way that would maintain the 
status quo of privileging economic actors in the oil palm plantation sector that are close 
allies of the political elite. To do this, ASEAN states chose to largely adhere to the ASEAN 
Way in regards to haze cooperation. Therefore, ASEAN initiatives on haze have resulted in 
outcomes that protect national economic interests, preserve state sovereignty, and deflect 
responsibility on the haze issue (Tan [S7], 2010; Yahaya [M13], 2010), instead of actually 
reducing or eradicating haze. 
Through a chronological examination of ASEAN haze initiatives, the following discussion 
argues that the observance of the ASEAN Way principles of sovereignty, non-interference 
and economic development above all have resulted in outcomes that were largely ineffective 
in curbing haze, but effective in protecting the interests of the business elites and further 
encouraging the unscrupulous practises of the region’s oil palm plantation industry. In 
short, this section argues that these cooperative agreements that were produced have been 
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deliberately designed by member states to protect national economic interests and preserve 
state sovereignty, while deflecting responsibility on the haze issue (Tan [S7], 2010; Yahaya 
[M13], 2010). 
ASEAN-Level Haze Mitigation Initiatives
ASEAN as an organization began to acknowledge haze as a regional concern in 1985, 
with the adoption of the Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
which made specific reference to air pollution and ‘transfrontier environmental effects’ 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 1995). This was followed over the years by other agreements with 
references to transboundary pollution, like the 1990 Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment 
and Development and the 1992 Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 1995). Indeed, the 1992 Singapore Resolution identified such 
transboundary pollution as a major environmental concern, and the same year, ASEAN 
environmental ministers agreed to harmonize policy directions and establish operational 
and technical cooperation, with special reference to haze (Tay, 2008). Following this, the 
first Workshop on Transboundary Pollution and Haze in ASEAN Countries was held in 
Balikpapan, Indonesia in September 1992, specifically addressing the haze as an individual 
problem in the region (ASEAN Secretariat, 1995). The first informal ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on the Environment in Kuching, Sarawak in 1994 marked the beginnings of a more 
visible effort by the ASEAN member countries to address the continuous problem of the 
haze. Here the ministers agreed to enhance cooperation to manage natural resources and 
control transboundary pollution within ASEAN, to develop an early warning and response 
system, and to improve the capacity of member countries in these areas (Yahaya, 2000). 
Figure 1. ASEAN initiatives relating directly to haze.
In 1995, member states agreed to adopt an ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary 
Pollution (Severino, 2006). The plan set out the broad policies and strategies to deal with 
atmospheric and other forms of transboundary pollution (Severino, 2006) including a 
number of concrete measures to prevent and respond to the fires and haze, such as the 
promotion of zero-burning practices, the deployment of  ground forces to prevent and 
detect forest fires, and the establishment of National Focal Points to strengthen regional 
coordination (Nguitragool, 2011). As a follow up to this plan, the ASEAN Senior Officials 
on the Environment Meeting established a Haze Technical Task Force (HTTF) with the 
objective of putting into operation the measures included in the Cooperation Plan (Severino, 
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2006). It outlined the efforts to be made at both national and regional levels (Tay, 1998). 
The Ministers also agreed to develop a common air-quality index and a regional fire-danger 
rating system (Tay, 2002). Countries also agreed to share knowledge and technology on the 
prevention and mitigation of forest fires, and to establish a mechanism for cooperation in 
combating forest fires (Tay, 1998). 
At the suggestion of the ASEAN Chair of Environmental Affairs (Interviewee A2, 2010) in 
1997, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze was established. This marked the beginning 
of the specific regionalism of haze mitigation at the ASEAN level, with the haze being 
given a special status of importance in the organization, separate from other transboundary 
environmental issues. The Meeting formulated the Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) 
under the HTTF to provide further commitments and detail to the Cooperation Plan (Evans, 
2001). In the spirit of the ASEAN Way, the RHAP was designed to overcome the haze 
problem with concerns of culture, economy and individual governments in mind (Abdullah 
[M43], 2011). It was a soft-law, non-binding instrument which stood on three pillars: the 
spirit of voluntarism, the no-fault finding rule, and the offer of assistance based on expertise 
and capability (Florano, 2004). Under the RHAP, member parties were obliged to develop 
their own plans, guidelines, and other measures to prevent and monitor fires that could 
cause transboundary haze pollution. 
The plan was divided into three parts. The first required member states to draw up national 
plans based on the regional plan. The second sought to strengthen the monitoring and 
anticipation of forest fires and increased pollution levels through the ASMC in Singapore. 
The third focused upon the enhancement of fire fighting capability (Jones, 2006). It also 
established an ASEAN Policy on Zero Burning. These guidelines for zero burning however 
were not meant to be prescriptive and controlled burning continued to be allowed for 
‘specific situations’. Other aspects emphasized in the RHAP included the identification and 
mobilization of resources, the exchange of information, and the development of markets for 
biomass and agricultural wastes, which are otherwise disposed of by burning (Nguitragool, 
2011). Furthermore, it solidified the breakdown in haze mitigation roles at the ASEAN level 
according to the country’s expertise (Yahaya, 2000): Malaysia for prevention, Singapore for 
monitoring and Indonesia for firefighting (Woon, 2002).
In 1998, the ASEAN Summit in Vietnam issued the Hanoi Plan of Action that called for 
full implementation of the RHAP by 2001 (Yahaya, 2000). It established a procedure by 
which fire fighting resources could be pooled for regional fire-fighting operations (S. Tay, 
2008). Specifically, it established two Sub-Regional Fire-Fighting Arrangements (SRFA) 
for Borneo and the Sumatra/Riau provinces in Indonesia under the RHAP to facilitate the 
movement of resources from one member country to the other on order to mitigate the haze 
problem (Yahaya, 2000). To complement the SRFA, a SRFA Legal Group was established 
in 2000 to examine the legal and enforcement issues in the region related to curbing forest 
fires (Jones, 2006).  
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In 2001, an Agreement on Transboundary haze Pollution (ATHP) was proposed to provide 
legally binding support for the RHAP (Florano, 2003). The ATHP was signed by all ten 
ASEAN member countries in 2002, in Kuala Lumpur. With the entry into force of the ATHP 
in 2003, specialised Technical Working Groups were tasked to develop the Comprehensive 
ASEAN Plan of Action on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007). 
The resulting Plan of Action included a cooperation mechanism for members to help 
Indonesia prevent haze by controlling fires, establishing early warning systems, exchanging 
information and technology, and providing mutual assistance (Khalik, 2006). Furthermore, 
a Panel of Experts (POE) was established to provide rapid independent assessment and 
recommendations to governments for the mobilization of resources. Article 5 of the ATHP 
also called for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Haze in Indonesia, 
and a supporting ASEAN Haze Fund (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002; Hudiono, 2003; Kurniawan, 
2002). 
An ASEAN Peatland Management Initiative (APMI) was proposed at the 9th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Haze in 2002. This initiative was to complement the SRFA initiatives 
with a special focus on addressing issues of fire prevention and control in the region’s 
peatlands. The initiative was established in collaboration with the Global Environment 
Center, an NGO focusing on peatland conservation in the region. The goals of the APMI are 
to promote sustainable management of peatlands through collective efforts and enhanced 
cooperation among ASEAN member countries towards achieving local community support 
and sustaining traditional livelihood options (Anshari [I42], 2011), to promote regional 
benefits through reduced risk of fire and associated haze, and to contribute globally in 
minimizing impacts of climate change as a result of carbon release from peatlands(ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2003). 
On top of these plans and agreements, other ASEAN initiatives on the haze include detailed 
operational procedures for monitoring, assessment and joint emergency response; the 
formation of a regional network made up of national focal points; an inventory of fire-fighting 
resources and training mechanisms; simulation exercises for joint emergency response 
between countries; and demonstration sites for the benefit of farmers, smallholders and 
shifting cultivators (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). As mentioned above, the political impetus 
for these initiatives were that states came increasingly under pressure from the public and 
civil society at the national, regional and international level to address the haze issue as 
awareness of the source and dangers of smoke haze spread (Ho, 1997; Interviewee I25, 
2010; Interviewee S4 & Interviewee S5, 2010; Interviewee S18, 2010; Lim [S13], 2010; 
New Straits Times, 1997). However, this plethora of plans and projects over the decades 
failed to break the persistent cycle of haze in the region.
Efforts to address the Southeast Asian haze have overwhelmingly originated from the ASEAN 
level (ASEAN Secretariat, 1995; Letchumanan [A6], 2010; Severino, 2006; Yahaya, 2000).
Indeed, regional collaboration over the haze became very high profile and was pegged as 
‘the earliest example of ASEAN cooperation over transboundary issues’ (Elliott, 2003; 
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Interviewee A2, 2010). Several scholars and agencies have praised ASEAN haze mitigation 
efforts. For example, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) hailed the 
ASEAN Way of haze collaboration (enshrining sovereignty and non-interference) as a 
pioneering achievement that could become a global model for the tackling of transboundary 
issues (Severino, 2006). It was envisioned that there would be an increasing emphasis 
of cooperative measures (carrots, like those prescribed in the ASEAN Way) instead of 
sanctions and strict state responsibility (sticks) as guidance devices for actions among other 
regions and in other international environmental regimes in the future (Tay, 2002). Scholars 
also argued that soft law agreements as is prevalent in ASEAN haze initiatives saved time, 
as ASEAN was able to immediately get the cooperation of Indonesia, which would have 
been unlikely under the threat of sanctions (Cotton, 1999; Florano, 2004). Solingen (2005) 
noted that such informal agreements could better facilitate cooperation because they make 
fewer informational demands on the parties, can be negotiated quickly, and can be rapidly 
modified as conditions change. These scholars further argued that these tactics enabled 
ASEAN to test and adjust their strategies without them being set in stone (Florano, 2004), 
and has led to enhanced contact between officials and experts across ASEAN (Cotton, 
1999). Other scholars say it has been useful in attracting funding (Florano, 2004; Mayer, 
2006) and technical assistance, as once a regional machinery is established based on local 
volunteerism, contributions from the international community would be expected to pour in 
(Florano, 2004). In this sense, ASEAN haze collaboration can be seen as providing symbolic 
diplomatic rather than legal pressure on culprits (Mayer, 2006), which have been viewed 
positively by the scholars and agencies mentioned here. 
However, despite these positive reviews, the regionalism of haze mitigation has failed to 
bring about meaningful results, and the haze persists as a regional pollution problem year 
after year (Campbell, 2005). While scholars like Koh and Robinson (2002) have argued 
that such regionalism should be able to help aggregate individual national policy positions 
around a joint position and facilitate both the establishment and the implementation of 
multilateral agreements, other scholars have argued that high levels of political regionalism 
in Southeast Asia are no guarantee of the effectiveness of solving such common problems 
(Hurrell, 1995). With member states being the main drivers of the organization, these states 
were able to shape the (albeit high levels of) regionalism of haze mitigation to privilege 
economic actors in the region’s oil palm plantation sector that are close allies of the political 
elite (Nesadurai, 2003). The ASEAN model of regionalism often results in a reassertion 
and extension of state authority as states seek out a greater degree of practical influence 
over the policies of other states and over the management of common problems (Hurrell, 
1995). Accordingly, this paper will show that states have elected to adhere to ASEAN Way 
principles as a way to reassert their authority and their right to self-determination over 
the haze issue, resulting in the continuing haze. More importantly, this enables them to 
continue to protect their crucial economic interests in the regional oil palm plantation sector 
(Campbell, 2005).Therefore, the regionalism strategy of addressing haze through ASEAN 
unsurprisingly fails to deliver environmentally positive results. 
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ASEAN Way Regionalism
In the regionalism literature, binding agreements, an institutionalized system, and the 
sectoral integration of policies are often singled out as some of the most important factors 
that render the regionalism process a success (Murray, 2010; Shelton, 2003). A close 
observance of these ASEAN initiatives on haze however reveals that these ASEAN Way-
compliant initiatives rarely contained these important factors for success. For example, 
the 1998 Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution and its complementary HTTF was 
found to be much less formal or binding than comparable documents in other regions such 
as Europe for curbing transboundary harm (Tay, 2008). The plan was largely a listing of 
general actions that governments ought to take to prevent and mitigate forest fires (Severino, 
2006). The absence of specific operational directives rendered the plan ineffective, and 
member countries were again thrown into crisis-management mode with the advent of the 
most serious haze of the region in 1997 to 1998 (Tay, 2008). Likewise, the 1998 RHAP 
continued to focus on national plans and capabilities instead of regional initiatives (Tay, 
1998). Like the Cooperation Plan, the RHAP exemplified a ‘soft law’ approach and was 
also not a legally binding agreement (Tay, 2008). It was left to the governments concerned 
to decide what was to be included in their national plans, with the freedom to bypass or 
equivocate on matters raised in the RHAP (Jones, 2006). There were no mechanisms under 
the plan for any member country to ensure that the other member countries fulfilled their 
obligations (Parliament of Singapore, 1998). 
Even the legally binding ATHP displayed many shortcomings. Regional engagement 
focusing on the maintenance of national sovereignty within ASEAN (Kim, 2011; Murray, 
2010) meant that states were compelled to ensure that the ATHP, even when legally binding, 
still observed their national interests, as opposed to the collective regional interest. Member 
states did this by insisting on close adherence to the spirit of the ASEAN Way. This ensured 
that the ATHP, while legally binding, was a highly watered down document where the costs 
of cooperation for concerned parties are greatly lowered (Nguitragool, 2011). This resulted 
in a treaty that, although technically legally binding, was ‘vague and lacking in various 
hard-law instruments such as strong dispute-resolution and enforcement mechanisms. 
Important provisions, including those for developing preventive measures, and a national 
emergency response, are left to member parties to interpret and apply’ (Nguitragool, 2011). 
Furthermore, as Article 27 of the Agreement states, ‘any dispute between Parties as to the 
interpretation or application of, or compliance with, this Agreement or any protocol thereto, 
shall be settled amicably by consultation or negotiation’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002). Hence, 
the ATHP did not significantly differ from the RHAP in either substance or in demands for 
member parties to make policy changes (Nguitragool, 2011).
As a result, most of the ASEAN initiatives on haze since were useful in generating a massive 
amount of information on the haze (Severino, 1999) but not much in terms of effective 
implementation of haze mitigation activities. The focus on national plans and the lack of 
legally binding documents ensured that states were largely free to pick and choose regional 
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initiatives that best suited their narrow economic national interests. For example, the RHAP 
established the role of the ASMC as the region’s mapping, imaging and forecasting provider 
for fires and haze. However, Malaysia used sovereignty arguments to strongly oppose the 
use of satellite data for haze monitoring purposes at the regional level during the early years 
of the haze (Campbell, 2005). Also, meteorological officials from Indonesia’s Lembaga 
Penerbangan dan Antariksa Nasional (Indonesian National Institute of Aeronautics and 
Space) that were interviewed said that Indonesian ministries also used similar arguments to 
explain their lack of acceptance of ASMC data. Indonesia preferred to use their own, less 
advanced meteorological data for fire mapping and haze monitoring (Haryanto [I16], 2010; 
Roswiniarti [I13], 2010). In respect for Indonesia’s sovereignty, ASEAN could not insist 
on Indonesia’s use of ASMC data. This choice of inferior fire mapping by Malaysia and 
Indonesia of course enables many local and foreign plantation companies in Indonesia to 
avoid scrutiny of fire activities on their land. Furthermore, even though the SRFA was meant 
to quickly facilitate the movement of fire-fighting resources from one member country 
to the other in the event of fires (Yahaya, 2000), Indonesia was known to turn down or 
unnecessarily delay entry of regional fire-fighting teams even though all requirements for 
the activation of SRFA assistance was fulfilled (Hedradjat [I14], 2010; Syarif [I2], 2010). 
This way, Indonesia was able to avoid opening its doors to unwanted external scrutiny of its 
internal commercial practises (Koh [S2], 2010; Tay [S12], 2010). 
Indonesia was also able to further protect their oil palm sector from scrutiny by refusing 
to ratify the ATHP. Close adherence of the non-interference norm has meant that neither 
the ASEAN Secretariat, nor any member country could question or pressure any other 
member state on the issue of ratification.The Indonesian Palm Oil Association (Gabungan 
Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit Indonesia or GAPKI), a powerful industry lobby group with close 
links to many ministers and parliamentarians in Indonesia, was instrumental in this decision 
(Soeharto [I51], 2012). One major concern of GAPKI was the fact that the ATHP allowed 
for additional protocols, and GAPKI was worried that this may later on include enforcement 
and liability clauses related to peatlands and use of fire, which would threaten the sector’s 
practices (Interviewee S1, 2010; Interviewee S21, 2010). As a result, Indonesia, the central 
country implicated in the haze, remains the only member yet to ratify the ATHP (Interviewee 
A4 & Interviewee A5, 2010).
Conclusion
This article has thus argued that effective implementation of environmental agreements 
depend largely on the style of regional engagement in practice in a particular region. As 
seen throughout this article, due to the ASEAN style of regional engagement that prioritizes 
national sovereignty, the negotiations, outcomes, and implementation of ASEAN haze 
initiatives was strategically shaped by member states to preserve national political and 
economic interests. Therefore, the outcomes of these initiatives have largely been ineffective 
in providing long-term, workable solutions for haze. Instead, these initiatives in the spirit 
of the ASEAN Way have enabled the unscrupulous practises of the regional oil palm sector 
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to continue. As a result, instead of offering solutions to the transboundary haze problem, 
engagement at the ASEAN level has served to protect the interests of the regional oil palm 
plantation sector, while allowing haze to persist. This approach i.e. the ASEAN Way for 
haze mitigation is unlikely to change in the near future.
End Notes
   1 Some interviewees allowed the researcher to use their real names for this research and 
some preferred to remain anonymous. Therefore, the researcher devised a system to 
maintain uniformity in the classification of interview sources for this thesis. To indicate 
the country or institution where the interview was conducted, the letters ‘I’ for Indonesia, 
‘M’ for Malaysia, ‘S’ for Singapore, and ‘A’ for ASEAN is used, along with a number to 
indicate the order of which the interview was conducted. For example, an interview who 
allowed himself or herself to be named, who was the tenth to be interviewed in Singapore, 
would appear referenced as, ‘Ali [S10]’. An anonymous interviewee in Malaysia would 
be referenced as ‘Interviewee M5’.
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